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1. Introduction 
The impact of different levels of savings and debt on the individual re-
employment probability is a neglected area of research. Most developed 
economies provide some social assistance in terms of financial support to the 
unemployed, presumably on the assumption that unemployed persons may 
experience financial hardship and that they may face borrowing constraints. 
In spite of this, there is very limited evidence on the level of financial re-
sources of the unemployed and on whether the levels of financial resources 
influence the duration of the unemployment spell. 
In the simplest model of job search, the assumption of risk neutrality leads 
to the specification of the objective function of the unemployed in terms of 
income maximization rather than in terms of the maximization of the utility 
derived from income. Under this set up, only the difference in expected 
future income streams is expected to affect the duration of unemployment and 
the unemployed's level of financial resources plays no role. However, if the 
assumption of risk neutrality is relaxed, the level of financial resources might 
exercise an influence on the probability of leaving unemployment. It has been 
argued that higher degrees of risk aversion result in a lower reservation wage 
and a shorter unemployment spell (Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Pissarides 
(1974)). One would expect that higher levels of savings (given a certain 
degree of risk aversion) raise the reservation wage. Savings can be used to 
support living standards during unemployment and higher savings allow the 
unemployed to be more "choosy" about accepting job offers. 
I study the impact of the unemployed's financial resources on the individ-
ual re-employment probability using the the LSUS data. These data contain 
rich information on the unemployed's levels of savings and debt. I also look 
at the impact on the re-employment probability of redundancy payments 
and other once-off payments associated with the commencement of the un-
employment spell. These payment may be seen as an (unexpected) increase 
in the level of savings. 
A drawback of the analysis is that the unemployed may misreport the 
levels of their savings and debt. In partictilar, the level of savings might be 
affected by misreporting because the unemployed might fear that they may 
be used by the interviewers to check their entitlement to the means-tested 
social assistance benefit, SB. There is, however, no evidence in this sense. 
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The structure of the paper is the following. In Section , I review the 
existing theory (and evidence) and discuss the expected impact of financial 
resources on the re-employment probability. Next, in Section the data are 
described. I present some descriptive analysis of the levels of savings and 
debt reported by the unemployed at different points in time. The results of 
estimation are discussed in Section . Alternative specifications of the savings 
and debt variables are tried out. The last Section concludes. 
2. The theoretical framework 
The literature on the relationship between the financial resources of the un-
employed and the probability of leaving unemployment is very limited. In 
the simplest job search model, the assumption of risk neutrality of the job 
seeker prevents one from allowing non-labour income and financial wealth 
to affect the individual re-employment probability. If the assumption of risk 
neutrality is relaxed, one would expect that higher levels of financial wealth 
result in higher reservation wages and longer unemployment durations, for a 
given degree of risk aversion. 
Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Pissarides (1974) argued (within the frame-
work of job search theory) that the more the unemployed are risk averse the 
lower is their reservation wage. This implies a negative relationship between 
higher degrees of risk aversion and the duration of unemployment. Feinberg 
(1976) tested empirically this hypothesis by means of multiple regression 
analysis, using the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The author prox-
ied risk aversion using replies to questions on conditions of car, having car 
insurance, use of seat beits, cigarette smoking, savings available. He con-
cluded that risk aversion has a significantly negative impact on the expected 
duration of unemployment. The work of Feinberg is about the only empirical 
work on savings and unemployment duration of which I am aware. Other 
studies are for example MacKay and Reid (1972), who allowed for the im-
pact of redundancy payments on the probability of leaving unemployment, 
although this was not their focus of interest. Their work relates to the UK. 
The issue of savings and unemployment duration was instead explicitly 
tackled by Ioannides (1981), although from a different point of view than 
that of the present study. The author modelled the relation between sav-
ings and unemployment duration in a job search framework and focusing on 
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the dissavings (savings) induced by unemployment (employment). Ioannides 
(1981) concluded that, under the assumption of a perfect capital market, the 
steady state rates of savings during periods of employment and of dissavings 
during periods of unemployment are independent of wealth and constant. In 
this model savings are an endogeneous variable and the capital market is 
assumed to be perfect. 
. More interesting for the purpose of the applied analysis carried out in 
this paper is the work of Danforth (1979), who relates the unemployed's de-
cision to accept a given job offer to their financial endowments. Danforth 
(1979) develops a job search model in. which the unemployed are assumed 
to maximize the utility they derive from consumption rather than from in-
come. Within this framework, assuming additively separable utility function 
and decreasing absolute risk aversion, the author proves the following three 
propositions: 
• higher levels of wealth result in lower acceptance probabilities, i. e. "the 
rich are more selective" (Danforth, 1979, p. 111); 
• an increase in the level of wealth raises the expected duration of un-
employment; i. e. "the rich search longer" (Danforth, 1979, p. 111); 
• expected returns from search increase with increased search time, i. e. 
"the rich get richer" (Danforth, 1979, p. 111). 
Danforth (1979) does not provide any empirical test of these propositions. 
To sum up, according to the theoretical predictions the impact of financial 
wealth on the re-employment probability is negative, for a given degree of 
risk aversion. However, higher degrees of risk aversion result in a lower 
reservation wage and a shorter unemployment duration (Kohn and Shavell, 
1974 and Pissarides, 1974). 
I estimate here the impact of savings and debt on the re-employment 
probability. The lével of savings represents a measure of the unemployed's 
financial wealth. However, it may also proxy risk aversion since more risk 
averse individuals are likely to save more. I allow for the impact of "once-
off" payments such as redundancy payments on the individual-remployment 
probability. These payments represent an (unexpected) increase in the un-
employed's level of wealth. Following the second of Danforth's propositions, 
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increases in the unemployed's level of wealth affect negatively the individ-
ual re-employment probability and result in longer expected unemployment 
durations. Instead, higher levels of debt may raise the unemployed's search 
intensity and lead to shorter unemployment durations (all things equal). 
However, debt may also proxy access to credit. The unemployed that have 
access to credit can afford to be more choosy about accepting job offers and 
may therefore have higher reservation wages (and longer expected unemploy-
ment durations). 
3. A description of the data 
Some descriptive analysis of the savings and debt of 
the unemployed 
The LSUS survey is very rich in information on the financial situation of the 
unemployed. The principal objective of this survey was, as stated by the 
survey planners: 
"to flesh out discussions of the financial situation of the un-
employed people by looking at the implications of levels of income, 
savings and debts for the material living standards of the families 
concemed. A particular focus of interest was the extent to which 
living standards change during a spell of unemployment" (Heady 
and Smith, 1989, p. 1). 
The unemployed and their spouses were asked many questions on the 
types and amounts of savings accumulated or debt run up. The questions 
covered the situation one month before the commencement of the unemploy-
ment spell and after the commencement of the unemployment spell. I have 
constructed total savings and debt variables using the information contained 
in the survey as follows. 
The savings of the unemployed at different points in time have been de-
fined as the total amount of money held under any of the following forms: 
• a bank current account, 
• a bank deposit account or bank savings account, 
• a Post Office Giro account, 
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• a National Savings Bank account at the Post Office, 
• a Trustee Savings Bank account, 
• a building society account, 
• stock shares or other securities, 
• Premium bonds, 
• a Christmas Club, 
• any öther form of savings. 
I have computed a separate variable for the amounts of any "once-off 
payments" such as redundancy payments or "pay in lieu of notice" received 
just before the commencement of the unemployment spell. 
The total level of debt of the unemployed at different points in time was 
computed summing up debt run up under the foüowing forms: 
• informal debt, money owed to friends or relatives, 
• institutional debt, money owed to 
— a money lender, pawnbroker, 
— a bank, under a personal loan agreement and/or as an overdraft, 
— a finance house, 
— a credit card company, 
— any other person or organization. 
• arrears debt, defined as any arrears with 
— mortgage payments, including any endowment policy on the mort-
gage 
— rent payments 
— rate, water rate or sewerage payments 
— gas and electricity bills 
— EP payments 
— insurance premiums, excluding any endowment policy on mort-
gage, 
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— any other household bills, such as telephone bills, 
— any other regular payments. 
I have constructed a separate variable for the amount of mortgage capital 
outstanding, if any, at the first interview. 
Summary descriptive statistics of the savings and debt reported by the 
unemployed are presented below. I consider two times for the purpose of 
comparison: one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell 
and at the first interview. I look at the net change in the level of individual 
resources passing from one point in time to the next. Next, the resources 
reported by the spouse (if any) of the unemployed are analysed. 
Some unemployed refused to reply to questions concerning their savings 
and/or debt. These were very few unemployed (less than 1% of the sample) 
and they are coded as if they had reported zero amounts. Some unemployed 
that reported extremely large amounts of savings or debt (greater than 6 
figures in £) were coded by the survey planners as "-2". They are also very 
few (2 cases) and I have recoded them as if reporting zero amounts1. Overall 
the unemployed in these two categories represent much less than 1% of the 
sample, at any time. There should be no large (additional) error introduced 
since it is not possible to exclude that some of the unemployed that reported 
zero amounts of savings were actually misreporting larger amounts. 
The amounts of total savings reported by the unemployed (not consider-
ing the amounts reported by their spouses) one month before the commence-
ment of the unemployment spell and about three months into the spell are 
described in table 0.1. About 38% of the unemployed report having no sav-
ings one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. About 
8.5% report small positive amounts of savings of less than £10, at the same 
date. These small amounts of savings reflect probably transaction balances 
held in accounts rather than in the pocket. About 11% of the unemployed re-
port positive amounts of savings larger than £10 and smaller than £100, one 
month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. Almost 11% 
report positive amounts larger than £100 and smaller than £300. Almost 
6% report positive amounts larger than £300 and less than £500. Overall, 
almost 35% of the unemployed report positive amounts of savings of less than 
£500 one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. 
1They are however excluded from the econometrie analysis. 
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Table 0.1: The amounts of savings before and after the commencement of the 
unemployment spell 
upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that reported such amounts 
amounts reporiei One month before U At the first interview 
in £ % %C) cum. % (*) % %(*) cum. % (*) 
0 38.2 42 
< 10 8.5 13.8 13.8 13.2 22.8 22.8 
< 100 11.3 18.3 32.1 11.1 19.2 42 
< 300 10.6 17.2 49.3 7 1* 54 
< 500 5.9 9.6 58.9 2.7 4.7 58.7 
< 1000 6 9.7 68.6 5.5 9.5 68.2 
< 1500 3.6 5.8 744 3.1 5.3 73:5 
< 2000 3.4 5.5 79.9 2.3 4 77.5 
< 3000 2.8 4.5 844 2 3.5 81 
< 4000 2.3 3.7 88.1 2.2 3.8 84.8 
< 5000 1.6 2.6 90.7 1.2 2 86.8 
< 10000 2.3 3.7 944 2.8 4.8 91.6 
< 15000 1.1 1.9 96.3 1.6 2.8 94-4 
< 20000 0.7 1.2 97.5 0.9 1.6 96 
< 25000 0.6 1 98.5 1.1 1.8 97.8 
< 50000 0.6 1 99.5 0.9 1.6 99.4 
> 50000 0.3 0.5 100 0.4 0.6 100 
The table relates to the subsa mple of male participants in both sample interviews (2035 units). The (*) indicates 
that the percentage is taken over the observations that report positive savings. 
The unemployed with savings larger than £500 and less than £1000 are 
6%. Almost 10% of the unemployed report savings larger than £1000 and 
less than £3000. The reader should perhaps be reminded that £3000 corre-
spond to the threshold level of the savings of the nuclear family below which 
the unemployed would gain entitlement to the means-tested unemployment 
benefit in 1982 (if they had passed the income test)2. Overall, about 50% 
of the unemployed report positive amounts of savings of less than £3000, 
one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. Including 
also the unemployed reporting no savings at the same date, the correspond-
ing figure becomes about 90%. The proportion of the unemployed reporting 
amounts of savings larger than £3000 is about 10% one month before the 
commencement of the unemployment spell. 
Almost half (46.9%) of the unemployed with positive amounts of savings 
at the first interview report savings of less than £3000. Overall (including 
the zero amounts) 89% of the unemployed report amounts of savings lower 
2The award of SB is conditional on passing both an income test and an assets test. 
The reference period is taken to be 1982 since all the information on benefit receipt at the 
first interview is collected in 1982 amounts, which were in force until November 1983. 
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than £3000 at the first interview. 
About four percent less of the unemployed report having any savings 
after the commencement of their unemployment spell: the percentage of the 
unemployed that report no savings (of any type) is 38.2% one month before 
the commencement of the unemployment spell and 42% three months into 
the spell. Instead, the number of the unemployed with savings of less than 
£10 increases by about 5% at the first interview (three months into the 
unemployment spell). The number of the unemployed with savings greater 
than £100 but less £5000 decreases slightly at the first interview relative to 
one month before the commencement of the observed unemployment spell. 
Instead, the number of the unemployed with savings larger than £5000 goes 
up by about 2%. This is probably explained by the receipt of redundancy or 
severance payments. 
Table 0.2: The amounts of once-off payments 
Upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that re-
in £ 
portea 
% 
such air 
%(*) 
lounts 
cum. % (*) 
0 56.4 
0.1 0.2 0.2 
< 100 8.8 20.1 20.3 
< 300 11.1 25.5 45.8 
< 500 3.7 8.5 54.3 
< 1000 4.1 9.4 63.7 
< 1500 2.3 5.3 69.0 
< 2000 1.6 3.7 72.7 
< 3000 2.4 5.4 78.1 
< 4000 1.8 4.0 82.1 
< 5000 1.7 3.8 85.9 
< 10000 3.0 6.7 92.6 
< 15000 1.1 2.5 95.1 
< 20000 1.1 2.5 97.6 
> 20000 1.1 2.5 100 
The table relates to he subsample of male participants in 
both sample intervieu is (2035 units). The (*) indicates that 
the percentage is tak ;n over the non-zero observations. 
Descriptive statistics of the amounts of redundancy payments and other 
"once-off" payments are given in Table 0.2. These payments are due to the 
en ding of a work contract: they go from redundancy and severance payments 
to pay in Ueu of notice and "week in hand". About 43% of the sample report 
to have received some "once-off" payment just before the commencement of 
their unemployment spell. However, the majority (54%) of the unemployed 
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with positive "once-off' payments reports payments of less than £500. These 
small amounts are "week in hand" or "pay in lieu of notice" payments. Some 
of the unempoyed report instead much larger amounts. For instance, about 
6% (of those that report positive "once-off" payments) report amounts larger 
than £10000. These large amounts are redundancy or severance payments. 
The total amounts of debt run up with friends, relatives, financial insti-
tutions and being in arrears with one's payments are shown in Table 0.3. 
Almost 50% of the unemployed report some debt one month before the be-
ginning of their unemployment spell and almost 60% report some debt three 
months into the unemployment spell (at the time of the first interview). The 
majority of the unemployed that are in debt owes amounts of money not 
larger than £500, at the two times considered. About 90% of them reports 
amounts of debt not larger than £3000 and about 95% not larger than £5000, 
at any time considered. 
Table 0.3: The amounts of total debt run up 
Upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that reported such amounts 
amounts reported One month before U At the first interview 
in £ % %(*) cum. % (*) % %(*) cum. % (*) 
0 53.7 41.6 
< 10 0.3 0.7 0.7 1.3 2.3 2.3 
< i0° 8.2 17.7 18.4 13.7 23.5 25.8 
< 300 11.4 24.6 43.0 13.8 23.6 49.4 
< 500 6.3 13.6 56.6 6.9 11.8 61.2 
< 1000 8 17.3 73.9 10.5 18.0 79.2 
< 1500 3.8 8.2 82.1 3.5 6.0 85.2 
< 2000 2 4.3 86.4 2.4 4-1 89.3 
< 3000 2.5 5.4 91.8 2.5 4.2 93.5 
< 4000 1.2 2.6 94-4 1.3 2.2 95.7 
< 5000 0.7 1.5 95.9 0.7 1.2 96.9 
< 10000 0.9 1.9 97.8 0.9 1.5 98.4 
< 15000 0.4 0.9 98.7 0.4 0.7 99.1 
< 20000 0.2 0.4 99.1 0.1 0.2 99.3 
< 25000 0.1 0.2 99.3 0.1 0.2 99.5 
< 50000 0.3 0.7 100 0.3 0.5 100 
> 50000 0 0 100 0 0 100 
The table relates to i he male particip ants in both sa mple interviews. The (*) indicates 
that the percentage i s taken over the non-zero's oh. ervations. Total debt is defined as 
the sum of informal, institutional an i arrears debt. The debt run by the spouses is not 
taken into account in this table. 
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Table 0.4: The change in net savings of the unemployed over time 
Upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that reported such 
amounts 
Absolute change net change tl net change t2 
in £ % cum. % % cum. % 
> - 5000 1.0 1.0 4.1 4-1 
> - 3000 1.3 2.3 2.9 7.0 
> - 1000 8.6 10.9 9.3 16.3 
> - 500 7.6 18.5 6.7 23.0 
> - 100 20.8 39.3 14-3 37.3 
>- 10 12.7 52.0 8.5 45.8 
< 0 1.5 53.5 7.6 53.4 
0 17.7 71.2 0.6 54-0 
< 10 1.5 72.7 2.0 56.0 
< 100 8.3 81.0 10.2 66.2 
< soo 7.7 88.7 15.4 81.6 
< 1000 S.8 91.5 7.4 89.0 
< 3000 3.2 94-7 6.3 95.3 
< 5000 1.5 96.2 1.5 96.8 
> 5000 3.8 100.0 3.2 100.0 
The table relates to the male participants in both sample interviews. 
The times tk, tl, t& relate respectively to one month before the com-
mencement of the unemployment spell, to the time of the first inter-
view and to the time of the second interview. Net savings are equal 
to total savings minus total debt, at a given point in time. The ab-
solute change in net savings at the first interview (tl) is computed 
subtracting the net savings at time tkfrom the net savings at time tl. 
Similarly, the absolute, change in net savings at the second interview 
(tZ) is computed subtracting the net savings at time tl from the net 
savings at time tk. 
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Next, I look at the individual change in the level of net savings passing 
from one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell to the 
time of the first interview (three months into the spell) and from the time 
of the first interview to the time of the second interview (fifteen months into 
the spell). The results are sumrnarized in Table 0.4. 
About 53% of the unemployed experience a reduction in the level of their 
net financial resources passing from one month before the commencement 
of the unemployment spell to three months into the spell. About 1% of 
the unemployed sees their net financial balances decrease by less than £10. 
About 13% loses between 10 and 100 £ . About 21% loses between 100 and 
500 £ . About 7% loses between 500 and 1000 £and about 8% loses between 
1000 and 3000 £. About 2% loses more than £3000. Almost 18% experiences 
no change in the level of their net financial balances, passing from one month 
before the commencement of their unemployment spell to three months into 
the spell. 
Almost 29% sees their financial resources increase after the commence-
ment of their unemployment spell. However, almost 10% gains less than 
£100. Almost 8% gains between 100 and 500 £ . Almost 3% gains between 
500 and 1000 £and about 3% gains between 1000 and 3000 £. About 5% 
experience an increase of more than £3000 in the level of net financial bal-
ances. The increases in the level of net financial balances are explained in 
large part by the receipt of "once-off" payments associated with the ending 
of a previous work contract and the commencement of the observed spell of 
unemployment, as discussed above. 
The proportion of the unemployed that see their net financial balances 
decrease passing from the first to the second survey interview is about 53%. 
This figure is almost identical to the corresponding figure for the change in 
net financial resources passing from one month before to three months into 
the unemployment spell. The proportion of the unemployed that experience 
no change in the level of their financial resources is now much smaller and 
equal to less than 1%. About 34% of the sample sees their financial resources 
increase passing from the first survey interview to the second. About 12% 
of the unemployed experience an increase of less than £100 in the level of 
their net financial balances. About 15% gains between 100 and 500 £and 
about 7% gains between 500 and 1000 £ . About 6% sees their net financial 
resources go up by more than £1000 and less than £3000. About 5% gains 
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more than £3000. 
Overall, the number of the unemployed that sees their net financial bal-
ances increase passing from the first to the second survey interview is higher 
than the corresponding number from one month to three months into the 
spell. This result is simply due to the fact that a large number of the un-
employed have gone back to work between the first and the second survey 
interview. In general, it is possible to conclude that the financial resources of 
the unemployed change considerably during the course of the unemployment 
spell. The largest number of the unemployed sees their net financial balances 
go down during the course of the unemployment spell. 
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are given in Table 0.5 below 
for the full sample considered (2030 observations) and for the unemployed 
with positive amounts of savings or debt (1629 observations). The reader is 
referred to Stancanelli (1993). for a defmition of the explanatory variables. 
I discuss below the specification of the savings and debt variables. Some un-
employed and/or their spouses reported very large amounts of savings/debt, 
of more than.six figures in pounds. In the survey, the amounts reported by 
these persons were coded as "-2" rather than the actual reported amount. 
Since it turns out that only five unemployed and/or their spouses reported 
such large amounts of savings and/or debt, these cases are dropped from the 
econometrie analysis carried out in this paper. Indeed, they might have been 
misreporting their savings/debt, but even if they reported the true amounts, 
they would anyway be too few to be representative of the incredibly rich or 
incredibly poor unemployed. 
The levels of savings and debt are measured one month before the com-
mencement of the unemployment spell to avoid potential endogeneity prob-
lems. Indeed, the level of the financial resources of the unemployed may vary 
during the course of the unemployment spell as a function of the duration of 
the unemployment spell. As a consequence, the savings and debt of the un-
employed at the first (or the second) survey interview might be endogeneous 
to the model. 
About 80% of the sample reported positive amounts of debt and/or sav-
ings one month before the commencement of their unemployment spell (see 
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Table ??). I find that the distribution of savings and debt of the unemployed 
is very skewed, with some unemployed reporting, for example, amounts of 
(total) savings or (total) debt of less than .£10 and some unemployed re-
porting amounts larger than .£10000. Some unemployed did not report any 
amounts of savings and/or debt or refused to reply to these questions. It 
is of course possible, as already discussed above that these people did not 
reply sincerely to the questions. Sensitivity of the results of estimation of 
the econometrie model to the exclusion/inclusion of these observations is 
checked. 
From Table 0.5, it emerges that the unemployed that report positive 
amounts of savings or debt have higher mean expected earnings (called "pre-
dicted" earnings in the Table) than the full sample, which includes the un-
employed that report zero amounts of savings or debt. No other substantial 
differences emerge between the two groups (except for differences in the mean 
levels of savings and debt). 
The savings and debt variables are entered separately into the model. 
The expected impact of higher levels of savings is to raise the unemployed's 
reservation wage by making the unemployed more "choosy" about accepting 
job offers (for a given degree of risk aversion). The expected impact of savings 
on the re-employment hazard rate is, therefore, negative. However, savings 
may also proxy risk aversion since the more risk averse individuals will tend 
to save more. Higher degrees of risk aversion are expected to result in lower 
reservation wages and shorter unemployment durations. If savings proxy 
risk aversion, then higher level of savings will be associated with shorter 
unemployment duration. 
The expected impact of debt is not clearcut either. Higher levels of debt 
may lower the unemployed's reservation wage and result in shorter unem-
ployment durations. However, debt may also proxy access to credit. In this 
case, the expected impact of higher levels of debt on the hazard rate is sim-
ilar to the expected impact of higher levels of savings (for a given degree of 
risk aversion). The unemployed that can borrow more can also afford to be 
more choosy about accepting job offers. If debt proxies access to credit, the 
expected impact of higher levels of debt on the hazard rate is negative. 
The savings and debt variables are specified in levels. A logarithmic spec-
ification does not seem appropriate since it would imply that proportional 
increases in these variables have equi-proportionate effects on the hazard. 
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It seems plausible that a 100% increase in debt (or savings) has a different 
impact if debt (or savings) increases, for instance, from .£500 to .£1000 than 
from £10 to £20. This choice is supported by the fact that the distribu-
tions of savings and debt are very skewed. However, savings and debt will 
be entered in logs for the purpose of sensitivity analysis. 
The "once-off" payments associated with the ending of the previous work 
contract and the commencernent of the unemployment spell may be seen as 
representing an (unexpected) increase in the level of savings. The expected 
impact of this variable on the hazard rate is negative. This variable is entered 
in levels for the same reasons given above. A logarithmic specification is also 
tried out. 
The savings and debt variables considered relate to the unemployed per-
son. In the econometrie analysis, I test also for the significance of the family's 
savings and debt. These are equal to the sum of the unemployed's savings 
(or debt) and the spouse's savings (or debt). 
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Table 0.5: Descriptive statistics of the economie variables 
Full lample Non zero viealth 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Left truncation period 13.407 1.057 13.395 1.040 
Unemployment duration (weeka) 44.588 17.755 43.600 17.718 
F/t work moat part year before U. .653 .476 .692 .462 
Unemployed most pari year before U. .222 .415 .193 .395 
Sick, no work moat part year before U. .036 .187 .029 .169 
Professional Occupation .019 .137 .021 .145 
Intermediate Occupation .154 .361 .172 .378 
Unskilled 0 ccupation .058 .234 .048 .215 
Occupation not available .071 .256 .056 .230 
Ag e 20-24 .124 .329 .112 .316 
Age 25-34 .323 .468 .319 .466 
Ag e 35-44 
.248 .432 .249 .432 
Age 45-54 .198 .398 .202 .402 
Age 55-58 .108 .310 .118 .323 
Has any child old less than 5 .341 •474 .328 .470 
Married .867 .339 .875 .330 
Spouse working 1 month before U. .269 .443 .295 .456 
Searches less than before .096 .294 .096 .295 
Values Leisure mort than Labour .137 •344 .142 .350 
experiences some shoriage of money .733 •443 .726 •446 
House 0-wner outright/with mortgage .381 .486 .432 .495 
County unemployment rate 13.586 3.205 13.500 3.224 
Receives only UB at tl .362 .481 .381 .486 
Receives no UB nor SB .046 .210 .050 .217 
benefit time varying (£) 3978.682 1855.357 3945.793 1877.564 
Predicted earnings, in £ 9097.565 2257.838 9201.237 2335.497 
predicted earnings not available .011 .106 .012 .110 
total savings one month before U. £ 1440.582 5736.440 1799.622 6361.343 
total debt one month before U. £ 618.116 2750.075 772.171 3054.499 
total family savings one month before 
U. £ 
total family debt one month before U. 
£ 
mortgage capital outstanding, £ 
1688.01 7559.100 1682.200 8133.040 
648.887 2765.740 689.290 2995.420 
2383.12 17423.920 2675.89 19123.990 
"once-ofj payments", £ 1211.604 4423.350 1376.549 4584.826 
The number of units that report non zt ro savings or non zero c ebt is 1629 The total sample 
is made of 2030 unemployed. The die hotomous v ariables take value one 1 vhen the condition 
stated for each of them is satisfied. The mean unem aloymcnt dur ition is com puted including the 
right-censored observations. The total f amily saving s are equal t 0 the sum oj ' the savings of the 
unemployed person and their spouses fo\ r the marrie i peopie and to the unem oloyed's savings for 
the single peopie. The total family debt is equal to t ïe sum of the debt of the unemployed person 
and their spouses for the married peopie and to the unemployed's debt for the aingle peopie. "U. 
" stands for "the unemployment spell". 
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4. Results of estimation 
Non parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates are provided first. Next, the results 
of estimation of the more complex econometrie model are discussed. This is 
a competing risks model of the re-employment probability. Two destination 
states out of unemployment have been allowed for: full-time work and other 
states. I am interested in the results for the exit into full-time work. The 
likelihood function for the model is given by Equation 0.1. The baseline 
hazard rate, a piecewise linear, is allowed to vary each month. 
LogL = £ £ {«* + /*"**(*)} + £ £ { - f exP{a\ + /3kxf(u)du}(0.1) 
keDieA), keD i Ju 
klh II = {t\n < t < T\+1), / = l , 2 , - - - , m , 
which is a competing risks model with two destination states &, 
full-time work, k = 1 
other economie states, k = 2. 
where i indicates an unemployed individual; A is the set of completed 
spells and B is the set of right-censored spells; A^ is the set of completed 
spells ending into destination state k. The time ij is the observed end of 
individual "i" spell of unemployment, ending with exit from unemployment 
or right-censoring and ts is the individual left truncation time, which varies 
between 11 and 17 weeks. 
Non parametric estimates 
I have carried out some non-parametric analysis of the re-employment prob-
ability for the unemployed with different levels of savings and debt. The 
survivor functions of different (mutually exclusive) groups of the unemployed 
have been estimated by Kaplan-Meier method. I compare the estimated sur-
vivor functions by means of visual inspection and also using the Log-Rank 
test3, which is based on the estimated Standard errors of the survivor func-
tions. 
The survivor function of the unemployed that reported zero levels of sav-
ings one month before the commencement of the their unemployment spell 
3A good reference for a description of this test is Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980). 
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Figure 0.1: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions for the Re-employment Proba-
bility 
(776 observations) is compared in Figure 0.1 with the survivor function of 
the unemployed that reported positive amounts of savings at the same date 
(1254 observations). The survivor function for the unemployed with positive 
amounts of savings lies below that for the unemployed that reported zero 
amounts of savings. The Log-Rank test rejects strongly the null hypothe-
sis that the survivor functions of the two groups of the unemployed are not 
significantly different (xl = 24.1). According to these non-parametric esti-
mates, the unemployed with positive levels of savings are more likely to exit 
from unemployment to take up a full-time job (at any time) than the unem-
ployed with no savings. However, the non-parametric estimates do not allow 
for heterogeneity of the two groups of the unemployed. It is possible that 
the unemployed with positive levels of savings have other "good" character-
istics (unaccounted for here) which might contribute to explain the results 
illustrated in Figure 0.1. 
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Figure 0.2: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions for the Re-employment Proba-
bility 
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Figure 0.3: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions for the Re-employment Proba-
bility 
In Figure 0.2, I compare the survivor function of the unemployed with 
savings larger than (or equal to) £1000 one month before the commencement 
of the their unemployment spell (415 observations) with the survivor function 
of the unemployed with savings of less than £1000 at the same date (1615 
observations). The estimated survivor functions of the two groups follow 
a similar pattern than that of the survivor functions of Figure 0.1. The 
survivor function of the unemployed with savings larger than (or equal to) 
£1000 lies below the survivor functions of the unemployed with savings of 
less than £1000. According to these results, higher levels of savings raise the 
individual re-employment probability. 
However, the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of the two groups 
are not signincantly different cannot be rejected on the basis of the Log-Rank 
test (xl = 1-74). I have obtained similar results by distinguishing the unem-
ployed with level of savings higher than £3000 (203 observations) one month 
before the commencement of the unemployment spell and the unemployed 
with savings of less than £3000 (1827 observations). The survivor function of 
the unemployed with savings larger than £3000 lies below that of the unem-
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ployed with savings of less than -£3000, at any point in time. The Log-Rank 
test can not reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of the two 
groups are not significantly different (xl = 0.96). 
In Figure 0.3, I compare the survivor function of the unemployed that 
reported zero amounts of debt (942 observations) one month before the com-
mencement of the their unemployment spell with the survivor function of the 
unemployed that reported positive amounts of debt (1088 observations) at 
the same date. The survivor function of the unemployed with no debt lies 
below that of the unemployed with positive debt, at any time. This implies 
that the unemployed in debt are less likely to exit unemployment to take 
up a full-time job than the unemployed that are not in debt. However, the 
Log-Rank test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions 
of the two groups are not significantly different (xl = 5-1)-
Parametric estimates 
Alternative specifications of the savings and debt variables were tried out. 
The results of estimation are given in Table 0.6, Table 0.7 and Table 0.8 
below. The reader is referred to Stancanelli (1993) for a discussion of the 
estimated impact of the explanatory variables of the model. The discussion 
below focus on the impact of the financial resources variables. I present first 
the results of estimation of a model where savings and debt are entered in 
levels. Next, I show my favourite model, where some spline functions are 
specified to capture the impact of savings and debt on the re-employment 
probability. I conclude this section with a discussion of some sensitivity 
analysis. 
In specification (1) and (2) of Table 0.6, the model is estimated sepa-
rately for the full sample (specification 1) and for unemployed that reported 
positive amounts of savings or debt (specification 2). The impact of the 
explanatory variables does not differ much across the two models. In partic-
ular, higher level of savings are found not to affect significantly the individual 
re-employment probability. The sign of the coëfficiënt on the level of savings 
is negative. This might confirm the view that higher levels of savings raise 
the reservation wage and lower the re-employment probability. The coëffi-
ciënt on debt is slightly significant and shows that debt affects negatively 
the individual re-employment probability. This finding supports the view 
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that. debt proxies access to credit. Access to credit may allow the unem-
ployed to be more choosy about accepting job offers and therefore lower the 
re-employment probability. The impact of debt is, however, very small. A 
10% increase in the level of debt evaluated at the mean (equal to about 14 
hundred £) lowers the re-employment hazard by less than 1%. 
Table 0.6: Results of estimation 
All (1) 
unemployed 
Reporting non-zero(2) 
Savings or Debt 
Va.ria.blt Coeff. SE CoefJ. SE 
F/t work year before 1 0.3713* 0.1368 0.4194* 0.1520 
Unemployed year before 0.3027* 0.1477 0.3729* 0.1672 
Sick year before -0.3808 0.2900 -0.2692 0.3488 
Profess. /Interm. Occ. 0.2110* 0.0985 0.2129* 0.1050 
Unskilled Occupation -0.4393* 0.1720 -0.5629* 0.2100 
Age 20-24 0.2230* 0.1075 0.1855 0.1228 
Ag e 35-44 -0.1786* 0.0903 -0.1247 0.0979 
Age 45-->4 -0.5951* 0.1107 -0.5506* 0.1213 
Age 55-58 -1.2643* 0.1734 -1.2035* 0.1825 
Has any chili aged < 5 -0.1989* 0.0871 -0.1886* 0.0962 
Married 
Spouse working 
0.1404 
0.3656* 
0.1237 
0.0873 
0.0935 
0.3060* 
0.1360 
0.0935 
Searches less 
Values Leis-are more 
experiencess money short age 
House ovmtr 
County U rate 
-0.7549* 
-0.2781* 
0.1890* 
0.3373* 
-0.0202* 
0.1728 
0.1146 
0.0862 
0.0739 
0.0106 
-0.7659* 
-0.3269* 
0.2224* 
0.3022* 
-0.Ó194 
0.1919 
0.1250 
0.0963 
0.0800 
0.0117 
Receives only UB 0.2006* 0.0849 0.1913* 0.0930 
Receives no UB, SB 0.0200 0.2799 -0.1269 0.2991 
UB/SB time varying, logs -0.0325 0.0603 -0.0571 0.0630 
Predicted earnings, logs. 0.6488* 0.2021 0.6330* 0.2175 
No pred. earn. 2.9561* 0.9591 2.6823* 1.0409 
Savings, in 100 £ -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0010 0.0008 
Debt, in 100 £ -0.0037 0.0019 -0.0042* 0.0020 
Maximum log-likelihood -643 6.9 -5 317.2 
The unemployed that reported amounts Oj f savings or debt greater than 6 figi ires in pounds 
uiere excluded from the analysis. Saving s and debt r elate to the amounts reported as to 
one month before the commcncemcnt of the unemp oyment spell. The re sults relate to 
exit into full-time work. The maximun 1 likelihood is computed by joint estimation of 
the tuio competing risks. Descriptive sta tistics of th • explanatory variable s are given in 
Table 0.5. 
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In Table 0.7, the results of estimation of alternative specifications of the 
financial resources variables are presented. In specification (3), the level of 
"once off" payments is entered among the regressors. The estimated coëffi-
ciënt on the levél of "once-off" payments is statistically significant and shows 
negative sign as expected. The "once-off" payments are assumed to repre-
sent (unexpected) increases in the level of financial resources associated with 
the commencement of the unemployment spell (and the ending of a previous 
work contract). According to the theoretical predictions, an increase in the 
level of financial wealth allows the unemployed to be more "choosy" about 
accepting job offers and therefore lowers the re-employment probability. The 
impact of "once-off" payments on the re-employment hazard is quite small. 
A 10% increase in the amount of "once-off" payments (evaluated at the mean 
of 12 hundred £) lowers the re-employment probability by less than 1%. The 
impact of debt (from specification 1) is unaffected by the additional regres-
sor. The estimated coëfficiënt on savings (not significant) becomes süghtly 
smaller in absolute value. 
In specification (4) of Table 0.7, the savings and debt variables are spec-
ified using two spline functions. The rationale for this specification is the 
large skewness of the distributions of savings and debt of the unemployed. 
The impact of the continuous savings (or debt) variable is allowed to differ for 
different values of savings (or debt). The following three intervals of savings 
(or debt) values are considered: 
• savings (or debt) less than .£500; 
• savings (or debt) greater or equal than £500 and less than £3000; 
• savings (or debt) greater or equal than £3000. 
The coefficients of the debt spline are not significantly different from zero. 
However, they show negative sign except for the first one, which relates to 
small amounts of debt of less than £500. It is possible that amounts of 
debt of less than £500 signal "no access to credit". There is, however, no 
firm explanation for this result. The impact of "once-off" payments does not 
vary much from specification (3). The coefficients of the savings spline are 
now statistically significant. The first two —on amounts of savings up to 
£500 and'amounts of savings from £500 up to £3000— show positive sign 
while the last one —on amounts of savings larger than £3000— has negative 
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sign. One possible explanation for this result is that smaller amounts of 
savings proxy, at least to a certain extent, individual risk aversion. In this 
case, then, higher levels of (small) savings represent higher degrees of risk 
aversion and higher degrees of risk avrsion result in lower reservation wages 
and shorter unemployment duration. Levels of savings larger than .£3000 
might, instead, capture only to a limited extent individual risk aversion and 
to a larger extent the impact of higher levels of financial wealth on the re-
employment hazard, which is expected to be positive for a given degree of 
risk aversion. An increase of 10% in the level of savings (evaluated at the 
level of 2.5 hundred pounds of savings) raises the re-employment hazard by 
about 1%, for the persons with savings below £500. An increase of 10% in 
the level of savings (evaluated at the level of 12.5 hundred pounds of savings) 
raises the hazard rate by about 1%, for the unemployed with savings between 
£500 and £3000. 
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Table 0.7: Results of estimation 
Specification (3) Specification (4) Specification (5) \ 
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
F/t work year before 0.3982* 0.1371 0.3816* 0.1377 0.3662* 0.1372 
Unemployed year before 0.3090* 0.1477 0.3246* 0.1483 0.3094* 0.1478 
Sick year before -0.3931 0.2901 -0.3188 0.2915 -0.3486 0.2905 
Profess. /Interm. Occ. 0.2151* 0.0980 0.1855 0.0983 0.1854 0.0981 
Unskilled Occupation 
-0.4407 * 0.1720 -0.3874* 0.1726 -0.3893* 0.1725 
Age £0-24 0.2325* 0.1076 0.2482* 0.1076 0.2446* 0.1075 
Ag e 35-44 -0.1808* 0.0903 -0.1848* 0.0910 
-0.1944* 0.0908 
Age 45-54 -0.5703* 0.1104 -0.5990* 0.1116 -0.6068* 0.1114 
Age 55-58 -1.2178* 0.1744 -1.3085* 0.1768 -1.3207* 0.1762 
Has any child aged < 5 -0.1983* 0.0871 -0.1960* 0.0874 -0.1897* 0.0873 
Married 0.1391 0.1237 0.1667 0.1236 0.1651 0.1236 
Spouse working 0.3564* 0.0875 0.3487* 0.0879 0.3573* 0.0876 
Searches less -0.7036* 0.1729 -0.6789* 0.1729 -0.6796* 0.1728 
Values Leisure more -0.2540* 0.1147 -0.2660* 0.1151 -0.2728* 0.1149 
Experiences money shortage 0.1509 0.0865 0.1804* 0.0873 0.1874* 0.0871 
House ovrner 0.3465* 0.0739 0.2757* 0.0765 0.2764* 0.0758 
County U rate -0.0326* 0.0106 -0.0225* 0.0106 -0.0220* 0.0106 
Receives only UB 0.2212* 0.0849 0.1824* 0.0857 0.1862* 0.0856 
Receives no UB, SB -0.0228 0.2802 -0.0692 0.2807 -0.0575 0.2805 
UB/SB time varying, logs -0.0412 0.0604 -0.0397 0.0606 • 0.0352 0.0605 
Predicted earnings, logs. 0.7123* 0.2026 0.6545* 0.2035 0.6575* 0.2035 
No prei. earn. 3.2306* 0.9610 3.0001* 0.9647 3.0194* 0.9646 
Savings, in 100 £ -0.0006 0.0008 
Debt, in 100 £ -0.0037* 0.0019 • 0.0033 0.0018 
"Once-off paymcnts, in 100 £ -0.0030* 0.0012 -0.0031* 0.0013 -0.0031* 0.0013 
Spline, 0> savings < £500, in 100 £ 0.0489* 0.0214 0.0482* 0.0213 
Spline, £500 > savings < £3000, in 0.0123* 0.0062 0.0123* 0.0062 
100 £ 
Spline, £300O> savings, in 100 £ -0.0028* 0.0013 -0.0028* 0.0013 
Spline, 0> debt < £500, in 100 £ 0.0223 0.0196 
Spline, £500 > debt < £3000, in 100 
£ 
Spline, £3000> debt, in 100 £ 
-0.0131 0.0077 
-0.0022 0.0022 
Maximum log-likelihood -643. '.3 -641 6.9 -64 21.0 
The estimation is carried outfor the full sample exce\ itfor the \ memployed that repor ted amounts of savings 
or debt greater than 6 figures in pound t, who were excluded j rom the an ilysis. Th e level of s avings and 
debt relate to the amounts reported as t } one month before the commencet nent of th e unemploy ment spell. 
The results relate to exit into full-time work. The m aximum i ikelihood is compnted by joint est imation of 
the two competing risks, full-time work and other ex its. DescT •iptive statis tics of tht explanator y variables 
are given in Table 0.5. 
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An increase of 10% in the level of savings (evaluated at 40 hundred pounds 
of savings) lowers the re-employment hazard by about 1%. The hypothesis 
that a linear relationship between savings and the re-employment probability 
(as in specification 3) is to be preferred to this piecewise linear specification 
is tested with a likelihood ratio test (xl — 32.8). The null hypothesis that 
the additional spline coefficients are not significantly different from zero is 
rejected. 
Specification (5) of Table 0.7, is the same as specification (4) except for 
the specification of the level of debt that is now entered linearly as before. 
The coëfficiënt on the level of debt is not significant but shows negative 
sign, as expected. The coefficients on the savings spline and on the level of 
"once-off" payments do not change relative to specification (4). 
To conclude, a spline specification of the savings of the unemployed per-
forms best. The robustness of the spline estimates is tested to alternative 
specifications of the savings and debt variables, as illustrated in Table 0.8. 
In specification (a), the savings and debt variables are entered in logarithms 
instead than in levels. The implication of the logarithmic specification is that 
of a constant elasticity, as already discussed in the data section above. The 
coëfficiënt on (logs) savings is significant and positive. It is close in absolute 
value to the coëfficiënt on the first spline segment in specification (4). The 
coëfficiënt on debt is not significant and shows negative sign, as before. The 
impact of the "once-off" payments is close to that found in previous speci-
fications. The impact of "once-off" payments becomes not significant if this 
variable is entered in logs (specification b). 
In specification (c), the family's levels of savings and debt are entered 
among the regressors (instead of the unemployed's level of savings and debt). 
None of the two variables is found to affect significantly the re-employment 
probability. The estimated impact of "once-off" payments is larger in abso-
lute value with respect to previous specification. 
In specification (d), some dummies that take value one for given levels 
of savings and debt are entered among the regressors instead of the actual 
levels of savings or debt. The intervals of savings and debt levels considered 
are the same used for the splines of specification (4) and (5) above. All the 
savings dummies show positive sign (and are statistically significant). The 
estimated coëfficiënt on the last savings dummy is however smaller than the 
coefficients on the previous two savings dummies. 
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Table 0.8: Some more results 
Specification Coeff. SE Max. log-lik. 
(a) Same specification as (3) bilt savings and debt variables 
are entered in logs 
(a) Savings, in logs of 100 £ 
(a) Debt, in logs of in 100 £ 
(a) Once off payments, in 100 £ 
0.0412* 
-0.0223 
-0.0031* 
0.0198 
0.0268 
0.0012 
-6433.9 
(b) Same as (a) but "once-off" payments are also in logs 
(b) Savings, in logs of 100 £ 
(b) Debt, in logs of in 100 £ 
(b) Once off payments, in logs of 100 £ 
0.0387* 
-0.0231 
-0.0283 
0.0198 
0.0269 
0.0269 
-6437.6 
(c) Same specification as (3) but I consider the family sav-
ings and debt 
(c) Total family savings, in £100 
(c) Total family debt, in £100 
(c) Once off payments, in 100 £ 
-0.0009 
0.0001 
0.0050* 
0.0014 
0.0004 
0.0017 
-6310.3 
(d) Same as specification (1) but some dummies are used 
to capture the impact of savings and debt levels 
(d) Dl=l if 0 > savings < £500 
(d) D2=l if £500 > savings < £3000 
(d) D3=l if £500 > savings < £3000 
(d) D4=t if 0 > debt < £500 
(d) D5=l if £500 > debt < £3000 
(d) D6=l if £500 > debt < £3000 
0.2155* 
0.4629* 
0.4U3* 
-0.0359 
0.0396 
-0.4623* 
0.0810 
0.1016 
0.1427 
0.0818 
0.0885 
0.2001 
-6423.7 
(e) Same as specification (4) except for the exclusion of 
"once-off" payments 
(e) Spline, 0> savings < £500, in 100 £ 
(e) Spline, £500 > savings < £3000, in 100 £ 
(e) Spline, £3000> savings, in 100 £ 
(e) Spline, 0> debt < £500, in 100 £ 
(e) Spline, £500 > debt < £3000, in 100 £ 
(e) Spline, £3O0O> debt, in 100 £ 
0.0476* 
0.0120 
-0.0029* 
0.0194 
-0.0128 
-0.0022 
0.0234 
0.0062 
0.0012 
0.0214 
0.0078 
0.0022 
-5301.7 
(f) No regressors are entered except for the variables beloui 
and the monthly constants of the baseline hazard rate 
(f) "Once-off payments, in 100 £ 
(f) Spline, 0> savings < £500 
(f) Spline, £500 > savings < £3000 
(f) Spline, £3000> savings 
(f) Spline, 0> debt < £500 
(f) Spline, £500 > debt < £3000 
(f) Spline, £3000> debt 
0.0003 
0.0938* 
-0.0021 
-0.0007 
-0.0734 
0.0340* 
-0.0036 
0.0012 
0.0376 
0.0106 
0.0013 
0.0415 
0.0135 
0.0038 
-6584.8 
The model is estimated for all the unemployed but those that reported amounts of savings 
or debt greater than 5 figure in pounds, as in model (1) above. The level of savings and 
debt relate to the amounts reported as to one month before the commencement of the 
unemployment spcll. The results relate to exit into full-time work. The maximum like-
lihood is computed by joint estimation of the two compeiing risks. Descriptive siatistics 
of the explanatory variables are given in the Appendix. 
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This confirrns the results obtained with the spline specification of the im-
pact of savings. The coëfficiënt on the last debt dummy —which takes value 
one for the unemployed with debt of more than £3000— is significantly dif-
ferent from zero and negative. The differences with the results of estimation 
of specification (4) are not so large since none of the estimated coefficients 
on the splines nor on the dummies are strongly significant. For the purpose 
of comparison, specification (e) is equivalent to specification (4) except for 
the exclusion of the "once-off " payments (which were also excluded from 
specification d). 
In specification (f), only the savings and debt variables (and the piecewise 
constants of the baseline hazard rate) are entered among the regressors. The 
level of "once-off" payments is now not significant. Only the first of the 
estimated coefficients on the savings spline is significant and shows positive 
sign. The coëfficiënt on the second segment of the debt spline is significant 
and negative. 
None of these alternative specifications of the savings and debt variables is 
found to perform better than specification (4). The detection of a significant 
but small impact of the level of financial resources of the unemployed on the 
individual re-employment probability is confirmed. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, I have investigated the impact of the level of financial resources 
of the unemployed on the re-employment probability, using the LSUS data. 
From the descriptive analysis of the savings and the debt of the unem-
ployed, the following facts emerged. The savings and debt of the unemployed 
vary in some cases considerably during the course of the unemployment spell. 
In particulax, while the savings of some unemployed increase because of the 
receipt of "once-off" payments (for example redundancy payments) associ-
ated with the commencement of the unemployment spell, the number of the 
unemployed in debt increases as well. The net financial resources deteriorate 
for about 53% of the unemployed, passing from one month before the com-
mencement of the unemployment spell to three months into the spell (when 
the first survey interview took place). The corresponding figure, passing 
from the first to the second survey interview, is also 53%. About 43% of the 
unemployed reported "once-off" payments due to the ending of the previous 
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work contract. The amounts of such payments vary considerably across the 
unemployed, going from less than £100 to over £10000. 
On the basis of this descriptive analysis, it is not possible to conclude on 
any association between the level of net financial resources of the unemployed 
and their exiting from unemployment before the time of the second survey 
interview. The distribution of the net resources of the unemployed with 
right-censored or completed unemployment spell does not dhïer substantially. 
Marital status is not found to affect to a large extent the financial wealth of 
the unemployed. 
The conclusion of the econometrie analysis are the foliowing. I find 
some evidence that the level of financial resources affects the individual re-
employment probability. In particular, I find that the receipt of redundancy 
payments or other "once-off" payments associated with the commencement 
of the unemployment spell and the ending of a previous work contract has a 
negative impact on the re-employment hazard rate. This type of payments 
represent an (unexpected) increase in the level of individual savings and their 
expected impact on the hazard rate is negative (Danforth, 1979). The magni-
tude of the impact of these "once-off" payments on the re-employment hazard 
is, however, very small. A 10% increase in the level of "once-off" payments 
(measured in hundred pounds) is found to raise the re-employment hazard 
rate by about 1%. 
The savings of the unemployed have a significant non-linear impact on 
the re-employment probability. The impact of savings is significantly differ-
ent from zero if a non-linear specification of the savings variable is adopted, 
such as for instance a linear spline or a logarithmic specification or a series 
of dummies taking value one for given intervals of savings. Savings are found 
to affect positively the re-employment probability. An explanation is that 
higher levels of savings proxy higher degrees of risk aversion. According to 
tbe theoretical predictions (Kohn and Shavell, 1974 and Pissarides, 1974), 
more risk averse individuals have lower reservation wages and shorter unem-
ployment durations. The evidence on the sign and the significance of the 
impact of savings is, however, not very robust. The impact of savings on the 
re-employment hazard (when significant) is quite small. 
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